

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA**

MONROE DIVISION

ARNOLD B. CURTIS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-CV-0169

VS.

SECTION P

JUDGE DONALD E. WALTER

WARDEN BRIAN NEWCOMER

MAG. JUDGE KAREN L. HAYES

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pro se petitioner Arnold B. Curtis filed the instant petition for writ of *habeas corpus* on January 27, 2010. Petitioner is incarcerated at the Ouachita Parish Detention Center, Monroe, Louisiana. He is a detainee awaiting trial on unspecified charges pending in the Fourth Judicial District Court under Docket Number 08-F-2394. Petitioner claims that his August 25, 2008, arrest was unlawful, that the State has withheld exculpatory evidence, and that his rights to a speedy trial and due process have been violated. He seeks dismissal of the pending charges and his release from custody. This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636 and the standing orders of the court. For the following reasons it is recommended that the petition be **DISMISSED**.

Background

On August 25, 2008, petitioner was stopped and detained by Officer Jerry Childress of the Monroe Police Department. The officer advised petitioner that he fit the description of a burglary suspect. Childress then determined that there was an active warrant for petitioner's arrest and petitioner was taken into custody and searched. Childress discovered contraband in the course of the search and petitioner was booked into the OPDC on that charge. On December 11,

2009, petitioner filed a motion for speedy trial. On January 4, 2010, his motion was denied. In addition, a preliminary hearing and a motion to suppress were also convened on January 4th. At the hearing, the lab results and the warrant supporting petitioner's arrest were introduced as evidence. The motion to suppress was apparently denied and the court found probable cause to continue petitioner's detention and prosecution.

Petitioner filed the instant petition on January 27, 2010. He prayed for the dismissal of all charges [Doc. 1, ¶18] and admitted that he has not exhausted available state court remedies.

[Doc. 1, ¶13(a)]

Law and Analysis

Petitioner is a pre-trial detainee who is challenging pending Louisiana state court criminal prosecutions. The petition is properly construed as seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which applies to persons in custody awaiting trial who have not yet been convicted. *Stringer v. Williams*, 161 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 1998); *Dickerson v. Louisiana*, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 484 U.S. 956, 108 S.Ct. 352, 98 L.Ed.2d 378 (1987) (Section 2254 applies only to post-trial situations and affords relief to a petitioner 'in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court.' Pretrial petitions are properly brought under §2241, 'which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case pending against him.');

and *Robinson v. Wade*, 686 F.2d 298, 302-03, 303 n. 8 (5th Cir.1982) ("Robinson's petition is properly considered to arise under 28 U.S.C. s 2241(c)(3), allowing the writ of *habeas corpus* to petitioners 'in custody in violation of the Constitution,' rather than under 28 U.S.C. s 2254(a), which requires that custody be 'pursuant to the judgment of a state court.'")

The requirement of exhaustion of state court remedies in a federal *habeas corpus* proceeding filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 is well established. A petitioner seeking federal *habeas corpus* relief cannot collaterally attack his state court conviction in federal court until he has exhausted available state remedies. *Rose v. Lundy*, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198 (1982); *Minor v. Lucas*, 697 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1983). The exhaustion requirement is a judicial abstention policy developed “to protect the state courts’ opportunity to confront and resolve initially any constitutional issues arising within their jurisdictions as well as to limit federal interference in the state adjudicatory process.” *Dickerson*, 816 F.2d at 225; *Picard v. Connor*, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509 (1971); *Shute v. Texas*, 117 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 1997). In order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have provided all state courts that could review the matter with a fair opportunity to review all of his *habeas corpus* claims before a federal court will review those claims. *Anderson v. Harless*, 459 U.S. 4, 103 S.Ct. 277 (1982); *Picard*, 404 U.S. 270.

With regard to *habeas* petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. §2241 by pre-trial detainees, there is no express statutory requirement that the detainee exhaust state court remedies prior to asserting his claims in federal court. However, the jurisprudence requires persons seeking such relief pursuant to §2241 to first exhaust state court remedies before seeking federal intervention. *Dickerson*, 816 F.2d at 224-225; *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky*, 410 U.S. 484, 489-90, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973); *Robinson v. Wade*, 686 F.2d at 303, n. 8 (“Although section 2241 contains no statutory requirement of exhaustion like that found in section 2254(b), exhaustion of state remedies has been held a necessary prelude to its invocation.”)

Furthermore, a federal court should abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction if the issue raised by a pre-trial detainee in a *habeas* petition may be resolved either by a trial on the merits in the state court or other state court proceedings. *Dickerson*, 816 F.2d at 225, citing *Braden*, 410 U.S. at 489-92, 93 S.Ct. 1123 at 1126-28. These requirements are imposed to preclude “the derailing of a pending state proceeding by an attempt to litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court.” *Braden*, 410 U.S. at 493, 93 S.Ct. at 1129; *Dickerson*, 816 F.2d at 225-226.

The nature of the remedy sought provides a further distinction. The jurisprudence distinguishes between a petitioner who seeks to “abort a state proceeding or to disrupt the orderly functioning of state judicial processes” from one who seeks only to enforce the state’s obligation to bring him promptly to trial. *Dickerson*, 816 F.2d at 225. In *Brown v. Estelle*, 530 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir.1976), the Fifth Circuit articulated the distinction:

[A]n attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise prevent a prosecution is of the first type, while an attempt to force the state to go to trial is of the second. While the former objective is normally not attainable through federal habeas corpus, the latter is, although the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies still must be met.

Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir.1976).

Thus, to the extent that petitioner seeks dismissal of the pending charges and his immediate release, he has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted and his petition should be dismissed with prejudice on that basis; further, to the extent that petitioner merely seeks enforcement of his right to a speedy trial, his petition must be dismissed because, by his own admission, petitioner failed to exhaust available state court remedies prior to filing his suit.

Therefore,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that this *habeas corpus* petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241 be **DISMISSED** for failing to exhaust available state court remedies and for failing to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this report and recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) after being served with a copy of any objections or response to the District judge at the time of filing.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See *Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association*, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996).

Signed in Chambers, Monroe, Louisiana, March 26, 2010.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Karen L. Hayes", is written over a horizontal line.

KAREN L. HAYES
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE